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COCXPIT RESOURCE M A G E M E N T  TRAINAVG: 
ARE CURRENT INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL? 
Gerald N. Cook 
Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in the Spring 1991 issue. It i~ reprinted due to its continuing value 
and timeliness. 
Investigators and members of the National Transportation Safety Board attribute the cause of the 
majority of airline accidents and incidents to pilot error. In an effort to address this problem, many airlines 
have developed training programs for pilots aimed at improving teamwork and decision making in the cockpit. 
Much of this training, generally termed cockpit resource management (CRM), has leadership style assessment 
and modification through group exercise as its foundation. Though cockpit resource management training 
has been widely embraced in the aviation industry, its effectiveness in improving flight safety has yet to be 
demonstrated. An argument is advanced that the current approach to this training is not likely t o  be effective. 
Other approaches are suggested. 
INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of the jet age in 1958, commercial 
air travel accident rates began a precipitous decline 
(Sears, 1989), but by the early 1970s the decline leveled 
off and has remained low but nearly constant. Because of 
jet aircraft systems' reliability and redundancy, accidents 
due primarily to mechanical failure are rare. The human 
system failure, the pilot, is the causal factor in more than 
70% of commercial airline accidents (Lautman and 
Gallimore, 1987). 
Researchers at the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) in the early 1970s began 
studying ways to further improve airline safety and 
concluded that the root causes of pilot error accidents 
must be addressed if the accident rate were to be further 
lowered. At the same time, flight operations managers at 
United Airlines came to similar conclusions from their 
investigations at United and other airlines. One accident, 
which has since become a classic in the study of pilot 
error, galvanized support for a different type of training 
for United's pilots. This new approach to pilot training, 
now commonly termed cockpit resource management 
(CRM), has been adopted by many airlines in an effort 
to further improve airline safety. 
This paper explores the foundations of CRM training 
and its prospects for success. 
CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 173 
In December 1978, United Flight 173, a DC-8 aircraft 
on a scheduled passenger flight from Denver to Portland, 
Ore., crashed after the crew delayed their approach and 
landing to work on an unsafe landing gear indication. 
The flight was routine until the gear extension was 
accompanied by a loud thump, abnormal vibration, 
aircraft yaw, and a red warning light for the right main 
landing gear. Following established procedure for this 
abnormality, the flight engineer confirmed all main 
landing gear were down and locked by a visual inspection 
system designed for that purpose. 
Some 28 minutes after reporting the gear problem to 
Portland air traffic controllers, the captain contacted 
United's dispatch and maintenance center controllers to 
discuss the problem. All agreed that the appropriate 
procedures had been completed. The conversation ended 
approximately 30 minutes before the aircraft crashed. For 
the remainder of the flight, the captain's main concern 
seems to have been to allow the flight attendants time to 
prepare the cabin for an emergency landing. 
During that time, both the first officer and flight 
engineer made several oblique and unassertive references 
to the increasingly critical fuel situation. So oblivious was 
- - - - -- 
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the captain to those comments that when the first of four 
engines quit and the first officer said, "We're losing an 
engine," the captain asked, "Why?" The crew managed to 
keep the remaining three engines running for another 
seven minutes; the DG8 crashed six miles from the 
runway after the fuel was exhausted and all engines 
flamed-out (NTSB, 1979). 
For many, the crash exemplified what was wrong with 
airline pilots and their approach to teamwork in the 
cockpit. Foushee and Helmreich (1988) have argued that 
both traditional pilot selection and training are, in part, 
responsible for these deficiencies. They point out that 
many airlines have long favored the military single-seat 
fighter pilot for hiring, the type immortalized by Tom 
Wolfe (1979) as having the right stuff. 
"Most of us are familiar with the common stereotype 
of the pilot as a fearless, self-sufficient, technically 
qualified, and slightly egotistical individual, whose job 
description calls for the defiance of death on a regular 
basisn (Foushee and Helrnreich, 1988 p. 191). Pilots who 
have this background and self-image are unlikely to 
function well in the multi-pilot crew when there is a need 
for teamwork and group decision processes. Although 
Foushee and Helmreich may have overestimated the 
extent to which this personality type is evident in airline 
cockpits, some of the attitudes they refer to are common 
(Helmreich, 1984). 
DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY EDUCATION 
FOR PILOTS 
At the time of the accident, some United managers 
were participating in a training program provided by 
Scientific Methods Inc., the organizational development 
firm founded by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. These 
managers were quick to note the similarity in the 
problems of business management addressed by this 
training and those involved in the crash of United 173. 
Accordingly, Scientific Methods was asked to develop a 
similar program for United's pilots (Oberle, 1990). 
Although United was not the first airline to carry out 
management training for pilots, its initial commitment to 
CRM training was the greatest, making United the 
industry leader in this area. 
Laboratory Education in Business 
Blake and Mouton were the developers of the 
Managerial Grid for assessing leadership styles and were 
early proponents of laboratory education in business. 
Intensive group experience education, known variously as 
T-group, encounter group, sensitivity training, and 
laboratoxy education, was developed and used extensively 
in many companies for thetwo decades after World War 
I1 (Kaplan, 1986). 
In the earliest stages, managers from different 
companies or work areas were assembled in training 
groups but not provided with any specific direction or 
given any explicit task. The role of the educator or 
facilitator was not to provide structure but rather to 
encourage the group members to identify and 
communicate their feelings about the group, its work as 
it evolved, and its members. This feedback was 
considered the most important product of the process 
(Argyris, 1964). The objective was to develop an ability 
for "openness" that the manager could then use on the 
job. Later developments included the use of interactive 
work groups and the introduction of a series of more 
structured tasks for the group to perform. 
Current methods for the management team-building 
aspect of organizational development are direct results of 
initial work in laboratory education (Lewis, 1975). 
Regardless of the training method advocated, scholars 
and practitioners believed that controlling, autocratic 
leadership styles, to the exclusion of relationships in the 
group, were counterproductive (Horstein, Heilman, 
Mone, & Tartell, 1987). 
Laboratory education was intended to heighten 
sensitivity to the importance of relationships. Underlying 
teamwork values were the free flow of valid information, 
a spirit of inquiry, nondefensiveness, and collaboration. 
These qualities seemed the perfect prescription for 
avoiding accidents like the Portland crash. 
CRM Training at United Airlines 
The United CRM program uses the Managerial Grid 
as the basis for examining individual leadership style. The 
Managerial Grid allows for various management styles to 
be depicted on a coordinate system where the X axis 
measures concern for production or task behavior with 
the Y axis showing concern for people or relationship 
behavior. 
The course introduction states that when the grid is 
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"understood it provides a comparative basis for seeing 
teamwork and how individuals contribute to it or prevent 
it from occurring by the way in which they interact with 
one another" (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 3). This 
emphasis is necessary because "well-educated and 
technically proficient crew members ... rarely understand 
what makes people tick" (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 2). 
Yet the skills in working with other crew members are 
essential to "reaching informed, strategically sound 
decisions and 'taking action accordinglyn (Scientific 
Methods, 1988, p. 1). 
Objectives of the course are five: (a) gain insight into 
one's own style of action, @) set standards for advocacy 
and inquiry based on openness and candor, (c) learn 
effective use of the captain's authority and crew member 
leadership, (d) develop principles of synergistic 
teamwork, and (e) understand the impact of external 
forces on cockpit behavior. 
Small teams of pilots work together intensely for 
three and a half days on a series of projects. This 
teamwork allows participants to develop skills in inquiry, 
advocacy, conflict solving, decision making, and 
critiqueing. The developers say these skills will not be 
taught but will develop through group interaction. At the 
end of the session, team members evaluate each other's 
strengths and weaknesses. This sometimes harsh 
evaluation by peers is intended to promote reflection and 
lead to a change of attitude and behavior. 
CRM Training at Other AirIines 
Cockpit resource management training, though not 
yet required by regulation, has been introduced in some 
form at most major airlines. Many programs are 
patterned after United's course and most programs use 
some form of leadership style assessment and group 
feedback 
EFFICACY 
Despite wide acceptance by the airline industry and 
10 years experience in CRM training, there is no 
conclusive evidence this training is effective in improving 
flight safety. Certainly pilot-error accidents continue to 
occur. Nevertheless, an accident is such a low frequency 
occurrence that a short-term change in the accident rate 
will not be statistically significant in proving the efficacy 
of training. 
Some anecdotal evidence, however, has been offered. 
United, which had not had a hull-loss accident since 
beginning its training program in 1979, suffered two 
accidents in 1989. One, a Boeing 747 on climb out of 
Honolulu lost a forward grgo door resulting in serious 
flight control problems and several passengers being 
sucked through the gaping hole in the fuselage. 
The second accident occurred when the center engine 
of a DC-10 aircraft exploded in flight, resulting in severe 
control problems and a spectacular televised crash 
landing at Sioux City, Iowa. Both captains credited their 
crews' CRM training for reducing the loss of life in these 
accidents (Langer, 1990). Still, this testimony is not 
considered hard statistical evidence and the vested 
interest of United Airlines must be acknowledged. 
Helmreich (1984) has argued that CRM training 
programs may be effective in changing pilot attitudes but 
are unlikely to affect underlying personalities. Further, 
there is evidence that personality is linked to pilot 
performance, including cockpit management. If 
personality is the predominant determinant of cockpit 
management behavior, then airline managers should 
concentrate on pilot selection rather than on training and 
allow cockpit management to gradually improve with the 
retirement of those pilots with inappropriate personality 
traits. 
In research at one airline, however, Helmreich has 
found that attitudes toward cockpit management differ 
significantly by pilot position, that is, captain, first officer, 
second officer. Because personality traits were not 
similarly linked to position, it would seem that 
personality traits and attitudes toward cockpit 
management are independent. In subsequent research at 
the same camer, a significant correlation between 
attitudes and flight deck performance in cockpit 
management was found (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, & 
Russini, 1986). 
CRM training has been shown to have a positive 
influence on pilot attitudes both as measured by pilots' 
subjective evaluation of the usefulness of the training and 
by psychological testing administered pre- and post- 
training (Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee, Gregorich, & 
Wilhelm, 1989). If CRM training is effective in changing 
pilots' attitudes, it should have a positive effect on actual 
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cockpit management. 
Helmreich and his colleagues reported preliminary 
results indicating CRM training does translate to 
improved cockpit management behaviors in actual and 
simulated flight (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, & 
Chidester, 1990). 
The researchers face several methodological 
problems. 
Perhaps the greatest difficulty is in obtaining 
consistency of evaluation from the pilots measuring 
cockpit management performance. 
Although the degree of efficacy is yet to be 
determined, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
(1989), sufficiently convinced that CRM training will be 
effective in improving safety, has proposed such training 
for all airline pilots. 
CRITICISMS 
There has been no research on the best pedagogical 
methods for CRM training. 
This lack of evidence notwithstanding, there are 
reasons to question whether programs that place heavy 
emphasis on leadership style assessment, feedback, and 
introspection are likely to be effective in improving 
airline safety. 
These questions involve (a) the underlying analysis of 
the causes of pilot error accidents, (b) the dissimilarity in 
the working roles of airline pilots and business managers, 
and (c) the history of ineffectiveness of laboratory 
training in business. 
Questionable Analysis 
Though not ignoring other combinations of task and 
relationship attitudes and behaviors, much current CRM 
thinking emphasizes the problem combination of the 
autocratic, task-oriented captain and the timid, 
unassertive subordinate crewmembers as in the case of 
the crew of United 173. 
Thus, much of the emphasis is on the concern for 
people or the relationships dimension of management 
style. Data suggests that many pilot-error accidents 
involve failures in areas that are the domain of 
traditional pilot training programs. In a study of fatal air 
camer accidents worldwide from 1977 through 1988, 
Sears (1989) found that deviations from standard 
operating procedures were a significant factor in 37%. 
Table I 
The Significant Accident Causes and Their Percentage of 
Presence in 93 Major Accidents 
33% Pilot deviated from basic operation procedures. 
26% Inadequate crosscheck by 2nd crew member. 
*9% Crews not conditioned for proper response 
during abnormal conditions. 
*6% Pilot did not recognize the need for go-around. 
4% Pilot incapacitation. 
*4% Inadequate piloting skills. 
3% Crew errors during training flights. 
*3% Pilot not trained to respond promptly to GPWS 
command. 
*3% Pilot unable to execute safe landing or go-around 
when runway sighting is lost below MDA or DH. 
3% Operational procedures did not require use of 
available approach aids. 
*3% Captain inexperienced in aircraft type. 
Source: The Boeing Airliner AprilIJune 1987 
* Factors suggesting a lack of technical knowledge andlor basic 
flying skills in the author's opinion. 
Training and practice of standard operating 
procedures for both normal and abnormal situations are 
a large part of traditional pilot training. In its 
investigation of two recent accidents resulting from the 
failure of the flight crews to properly set flaps for takeoff 
(Northwest at Detroit and Delta at Dallas), the National 
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (1988, 1989) found 
in both cases the captains failed to maintain cockpit 
discipline and follow standard operating procedures. 
In another study conducted at Boeing Aircraft, 
Lautman and Gallimore (1987) found that 12% of all  
commercial aircraft operators accounted for 90% of all 
accidents. Although the study was not scientifically based, 
a series of interviews showed that standardization and 
cockpit discipline were common elements of those 
operators with the best safety records. 
In an early study, Sears (1986) found a lack of 
technical knowledge and/or basic flying skills to be a 
contributing factor in approximately 30% of air camer 
accidents (Table 1). 
These findings suggest that more emphasis should be 
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placed on task behavior in CRM training. 
Dissimilarity of Pilot and Management Teams 
To the extent that the importance of relationships 
also should be emphasized in CRM training, there is 
reason to question whether group exercises are an 
effective means of doing so. Since laboratory education 
was designed to address the problems of openness in 
management teams and CRM training draws directly on 
this foundation, significant differences between the work 
of management and pilot teams may invalidate 
assumptions about the transferability of the training. 
Both by tradition and federal law, an airline captain 
has absolute authority over the operation of hisher crew 
and the aircraft. A manager has similar responsibilities 
though perhaps more limited authority. For most 
situations the similarity ends here. For all normal flying 
situations, procedures for aircraft operations are highly 
developed, specific in detail, and intended to be precisely 
followed. The same is true for all abnormal conditions 
that have been anticipated. Traditional pilot training 
emphasizes rote learning and practicing of these 
procedures. In contrast, high-level management teams 
operate in a world of much less certainty, in longer time 
horizons, and in environments over which management 
has little control. 
Lewis (1975) delineates the conditions most favorable 
for the operation of integrated management teams most 
likely to benefit from team development training. Among 
those conditions are: (a) An external environment that is 
highly variable and/or changing rapidly; @) an 
organization that is young and/or undergoing major 
change, resulting in fluid structure, few operating policies 
and procedures, and emerging role definitions; (c) 
technology that is relatively new and/or developing 
rapidly; and (d) a tendency toward frequent use of project 
management, temporary task forces, and/or ad hoc 
problem-solving groups to augment conventional 
organizational structures. 
These conditions are not characteristic of the airline 
pilot's job and, by extension, team building may be 
inappropriate. To the contrary, A r e  (1%4) 
acknowledges that directive style leadership is 
appropriate for routine decisions and extreme 
emergencies. These, in fact, are exactly the working 
conditions faced by airline pilots. A well-known adage 
among pilots characterizes their job as hours and hours 
of boredom interspersed with moments of sheer terror. 
Continuity is an additional significant difference 
between management teams and airline crews. Though 
management team memgrs can be expected to take 
some time to get to know one another, develop working 
relationships, and then work together for an extended 
period, it is common for airline pilots to meet for the 
first time and one hour later to have to function as a 
highly integrated team performing a complex task. At 
larger airlines, it is also common for a crew to work 
together for one month and then possibly never again. 
Such teamwork can be accomplished only by adherence 
to detailed standard operating procedures. 
Effectiveness of Laboratory Training in Business 
Laboratory training programs for management, which 
are the basis for many CRM programs, eventually proved 
disappointing even to their advocates. Chris Ar@ 
(1979), who championed the cause of laboratory 
education for many years, eventually concluded "there 
may be factors endemic to the theory and practice of the 
laboratory education that act to inhibit transferability" (p. 
197). Kaplan (1986) concludes that laboratory training 
failed for two reasons: (a) some participants were hurt in 
the process and their working relations damaged, and (b) 
those who felt positive about the process were generally 
unable to apply what they had learned in the training. 
There is evidence that both of these problems are results 
of current CRM training. 
Although reporting a positive shift in attitudes by 
most pilots participating in CRM programs, Helmreich 
et al. (1989) have found a negative reaction in about 15% 
of those trained. The data indicate those pilots reacting 
most negatively are low in both task and relationships on 
the grid measurement system. These are the pilots judged 
to be most in need of improvement. 
Although the developers of the United CRM 
program deny it, elements of T-group and sensitivity 
training are certainly involved (Public Broadcasting 
System, 1986). During a sales presentation of the course 
to this author, the Scientific Methods representative 
explained with apparent satisfaction how he had 
witnessed senior captains and, in one instance, a chief 
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pilot, break down and cry before the group during the 
final evaluation. 
As Jack Gordon (1989) sees it, this "personality 
shredding is a pretty fair description of what went on in 
some sensitivity training sessions, and that at least a few 
people were seriously wounded" (p. 29). 
Problems can occur elsewhere even when training 
does not involve such direct feedback as was 
characteristic of early sensitivity training. Following the 
breakup of AT&T, Pacific Bell instituted a corporate- 
wide program called Leadership Development. The 
company's director of training noted that the program 
"was a long way from sensitivity training" (Gordon, 1989, 
p. 38). Nonetheless, following complaints by some 
employees and an investigation by the California Public 
Utilities Commission, the program was dropped. These 
results could have been expected. In an early article 
advocating T-group training, Argyris (1964) cautions that 
individuals who are highly defensive should not be 
involved in the training. 
The second reason cited by Kaplan for the failure of 
laboratory education is that even when participants had 
a positive reaction, they frequently had difficulty applying 
what they had learned once they returned to the job. 
Given this difficulty, positive effects are short-lived. 
Similar criticisms have been leveled at CRM training. 
Walker and Youngblood (1989) note: "Some of the 
existing programs rely heavily on self-analysis without 
emphasis on actually working together or giving skills to 
use while working in the cockpit. While self-analysis may 
give some personal insight into individual styles of 
management, it does not deal with how to apply skills to 
working better with other crew membersn (p. 56). The 
difficulty sterns from an emphasis on attitudes and 
motivations rather than on behaviors. To be effective, 
training programs must identify behaviors that are 
objective, observable, and measurable (Luthans, Maciag, 
& Rosenkrantz, 1983, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1988). Most 
CRM programs fail to define the cockpit behaviors that 
should result from the training program. 
NEW APPROACHES TO CRM TRAINING 
Current approaches of CRM training have been 
questioned by others. John Lauber in his presentation to 
the Annual Airline Operations Forum, Airline Safety in 
a transitional era (November, 1988), stated his concern 
that "some of us have fallen into the dangerous waters of 
hot tub harmony. What I mean by this is that I see signs 
of too much emphasis on interpersonal relationships in 
some of the approaches to-cockpit resource management, 
and not enough emphasis on command and leadership 
skills." Doug Schwartz of Flightsafety International 
describes an evolution from first-generation CRM 
programs, which emphasized open communication, 
teamwork, and advocacy, to training that will provide 
specific and measurable cockpit behaviors (Hughes, 
1989). 
The foregoing criticism is not intended to suggest 
leadership style analysis has no place in pilot education. 
In fact, an appreciation of the various leadership styles 
can provide valuable insights into pilots. 
Given evidence that such attempts have not been 
successful in business settings, and in the absence of 
explicitly defined behaviors to be used in the cockpit, the 
question is what amount of scarce training time should 
be spent in an attempt to modify existing pilot attitudes 
and leadership styles. 
There are other elements of CRM training, some old 
and some more recently developed, that promise to be 
effective. 
Standard Operating Procedures 
First, the importance of strict adherence to existing 
standard operating procedures must be emphasized. Case 
study of accidents, particularly when video recreations are 
available, should be effective. Strong flight operations 
management support is critical to the development of 
norms requiring the use of standard procedures. 
Safety Monitor 
Procedures can be developed that delegate the role 
of safety monitor to the non-flying pilot, who should be 
responsible for challenging any deviation from standard 
procedure in much the same way that a challenge to a 
deviation from a stabilized approach profile is now 
required. 
There are circumstances when deviation from 
standard procedure is appropriate, but the reasons for 
such a deviation must first be fully established and 
explained to the crew. The safety monitor also would 
bring to the attention of the flying pilot information 
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Table 2 
Error Chain Elements 
1. Ambiguity 
2. Fixation and/or Preoccupation 
3. Confusion or Empty Feeling 
4. No one flying the aircraft 
5. No one looking out window 
6. Use of undocumented procedure 
7. Violating minimums and/or limitations 
8. Unresolved discrepancy 
9. Failure to meet targets 
10. Departure from standard operating procedure 
11. Communication failure 
Source: Schwartz (1 989) 
critical to the safe operation of the aircraft (Bolman, 
1979). 
Error Chain 
Most accidents result from a unique series of events 
and errors, no one of which may be uncommon or, in 
isolation, would lead to an accident (Sears, 1986). If this 
"error chain" could be detected and broken while in 
progress, accidents could be avoided. Flightsafety has 
developed a list of clues that may point to an error chain 
in progress (Table 2) (Schwartz, 1989). 
Decision Processes 
Although decision making is frequently mentioned in 
CRM training, the actual process is seldom more than 
superficially explored. It seems an assumption has been 
made that if sufficient openness in the cockpit can be 
instilled, good decisions will certainly follow. Many 
decisions in aviation are highly structured and program- 
mable, consequently detailed procedures exist for most 
mechanical problems. But pilots also occasionally face 
non-programmable decisions that are left to pilot 
judgment. The aviation community has generally felt that 
pilot judgment is either inzate in good pilots or acquired 
over time, but were not a proper subject of formal 
training (Buch & Diehl, 1984). 
This attitude is in contrast to business management 
training, which devotes considerable effort to developing 
business judgment. Understanding the classical decision 
model and practice in its application to aviation problems 
can be effective. 
CONCLUSION 
CRM is not the only avenue being explored to 
improve the safety of air travel. The newest generation of 
commercial aircraft make extensive use of computers to 
automate functions that previously required pilot control. 
Though the introduction of high levels of automation 
presents new cockpit management problems (Wiener, 
1989), there is reason to believe that these newer aircraft 
will be safer. Because pilot error continues to a major 
contributor to commercial aircraft accidents, work to 
improve the human system holds the greatest promise for 
improving airline safety. Formal CRM training is more 
than 10 years old and has been adopted by most airlines. 
Preliminary research results indicate the training is 
effective in improving cockpit management behaviors. 
There is no research on the relative effectiveness of 
various approaches to CRM training, but there are 
reasons to question whether approaches that emphasize 
assessment and modification of leadership styles through 
group exercises will be effective. Until research results 
are available, CRM training should de-emphasize the 
study of leadership styles so that other promising 
approaches to training can be included.0 
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